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March for Life: The UK’s anti-abortion movement is becoming more organised and emboldened

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The March for Life UK’s pro-life health summit this year centered on the theme “Abortion isn’t Healthcare,” a message that echoed throughout the event as various pro-life groups gathered at the Emmanuel Centre in Westminster. These groups expressed perspectives aligned with the broader pro-life movement, emphasising ethical, moral, and religious arguments. The core message was clear and unwavering: “Life begins at conception, no exception!”

I attended the summit undercover to understand the perspectives of British abortion opponents and assess whether, like in the US, the pro-life movement is gaining momentum in the UK. Until now, I believed there was little political traction for pro-life legislation, especially after the Conservative government was voted out in July, taking prominent pro-life MPs like Jacob Rees-Mogg with it. While the US pro-life movement is often seen as extreme, it’s crucial to recognise that rights can be reversed in the UK as well. We cannot afford to be complacent; understanding the influence of these political minorities is essential.

Upon arrival at the summit, I was met by shouting counter-protesters and heavy security, which initially reassured me that I was entering a small subsection of a minority mindset. However, this sense of reassurance quickly faded once I stepped inside. The crowds far outnumbered the protesters, and the event exceeded my expectations in size, budget, and organisation. What I had assumed to be a fringe gathering turned out to be a well-funded, professionally coordinated movement that could be more influential than I had previously thought.

In the event’s organisational space, tables were set up around the room, each occupied by various pro-life associations. I stopped to speak with a young man from ‘Abortion Resistance,’ a smaller, youth-led group focused on mobilising younger generations. A young male spokesperson for the group expressed frustration over the lack of strong pro-life stances among UK right-wing figures, remarking that “in an Andrew Tate culture, too many on the right are pro-choice because they think they can get laid more.” Although his comment seemed absurd at first, it highlighted a valid point: right-wing politics in the UK tends to focus on issues like immigration, leaving reproductive rights largely sidelined.

As I continued exploring the room, I was invited to participate in a segment on a pro-life-focused radio station, presumably seeking guests to boost their dwindling audience. I also engaged in a conversation with representatives from ‘Students for Life,’ a group particularly focused on supporting students like myself.

At every table, the message to pro-choice individuals was clear and consistent: “there are other options.” The organisations I spoke to implied that many in the pro-choice camp are unaware of alternatives, believing abortion is their only option. The pro-life representatives aimed to reassure women that they were there to support them in choosing life. Curious about the specifics behind these claims, I asked what support they would offer if I, as a student, became pregnant. While they mentioned financial aid, their answers were vague, stating that the amount would be determined on a case-by-case basis.

What stood out to me, and felt disappointing though not surprising, was the language used to describe the motivation behind their initiatives. One volunteer explained that the financial aid was meant to help the woman “keep the baby” rather than support her in continuing her education. This was striking because, although the ‘Students for Life’ website claims, “We aim to support pregnant students and parents on campus and believe that no student should have to choose between education and having a baby”, it became clear in our conversation that their primary goal wasn’t about empowering women to pursue both; it was about ensuring they kept the baby.

Many organisations, particularly those run by Catholics, emphasised that their pro-life stance extended beyond abortion to include opposition to suicide, IVF (in vitro fertilisation), and assisted dying (euthanasia). In conversations with the Catholic Medical Association, which helps healthcare professionals integrate their faith with clinical practice, and the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC), which advocates for the defence of “life from conception to natural death,” this broader perspective was clear. Both groups, along with others, shared the belief that life is sacred and divinely ordained, viewing practices like IVF and euthanasia as unnatural and contrary to the will of the Christian God. This alignment reflects a broader pro-life ideology that could influence healthcare policy beyond reproductive rights.

When it came to IVF, Fiat Fertility was the only group at the summit specifically focusing on alternatives. Represented by key speaker Ira Winter, they presented a different approach to fertility treatments. During our conversation, a young man and woman tailored their pitch to me, correctly assuming that I wasn’t currently seeking pregnancy. What stood out was how the woman avoided mentioning fertility, IVF, or “natural conception” until the very end. Instead, she focused on how tracking menstrual cycles could aid conditions like polycystic ovary syndrome (PCOS) and endometriosis. Only as the conversation was ending did she bring up her belief in “fertility windows,” suggesting that ovulation tracking could resolve fertility issues for couples. It was clear to me that she likely hadn’t experienced fertility struggles first-hand, which made her approach feel somewhat detached from the reality many couples face.

After visiting the various stalls, I attended a pro-life talk aimed at ages 13-17, led by Dr Liz Corcoran, chair of the Down’s Syndrome Research Foundation, titled “The Truth About Life with Down’s Syndrome”. Despite being 21, I can often pass for a teenager, so no one questioned my presence as I quietly joined the circle of chairs next to Dr Corcoran. Based on what I had read on her website, I knew her advocacy for individuals with Down’s syndrome was deeply personal, rooted in her love for her brother with the condition. I expected the talk to be a heartfelt reflection on life with Down’s syndrome, filled with personal stories and insights into both the challenges and joys of loving someone with the condition. However, Dr Corcoran focused almost entirely on the technical history of prenatal screening for Down’s syndrome, missing an opportunity to humanise the issue for her young audience. Instead, the talk centred on demonising pregnancy screenings for the condition.

At one point, Dr Corcoran asked us to visualise 100 pregnant women, each carrying a baby with Down’s syndrome, gathered in the centre of the circle. She then asked how many of them would choose to abort, using exaggerated language and imagery for emotional impact. I correctly answered 90%, but her response felt judgmental, as she critiqued those who opt for termination without addressing the complex realities behind such decisions. The discussion lacked balance and compassion, turning into moral condemnation. Despite the talk being titled “The Truth About Life with Down’s Syndrome”, there was little focus on the actual experiences of people living with the condition, perhaps because no one present had it. It would have been far more insightful to hear from her brother or someone else with Down’s syndrome, either in person or remotely.

This tone felt especially troubling given the young, impressionable audience. There was no exploration of the societal support needed to make raising a child with Down’s syndrome more feasible, no inclusion of voices from individuals with the condition, and no emphasis on the broader need for societal acceptance and resources. The talk became yet another platform for guilt-driven rhetoric, devoid of compassion or balance.

My main takeaways from the March for Life UK summit were that it was a well-organised and financially robust display of the pro-life movement in the UK, revealing a level of sophistication and structure that surprised me. While the summit’s organisation was impressive, its messaging lacked the nuance and empathy necessary to foster real dialogue on such a complex issue. Nevertheless, the event highlighted that, while reproductive rights in the UK may seem secure, the overturning of Roe v. Wade in the US has emboldened pro-life activists and sparked renewed concern about the potential for similar shifts in the UK. Key subthemes such as opposition to IVF and assisted dying underscored the movement’s broader agenda, rooted in religious beliefs about the sanctity of life from conception to natural death.

Despite the veneer of offering support and alternatives for women, many interactions revealed that the primary goal of these groups remains focused on preventing abortion rather than genuinely empowering women to make their own choices. The summit left me with a sobering reminder: although the pro-life movement in the UK may not dominate headlines, it is increasingly organised and persistent, and its influence should not be underestimated.

Rights that seem settled are never entirely secure, and continued engagement and vigilance are necessary to ensure they remain intact.

Could AI help fix the issues of ineffective alternative medicine regulation?

As I have covered in the pages of this magazine previously, the official regulation of alternative medicine in the UK is far from straightforward. The General Chiropractic Council (GCC) and General Osteopathic Council (GOsC) are the only statutory regulators of pseudomedical disciplines, while other therapists are left only to voluntary regulation via an ‘Accredited Register’. More broadly, all advertising (including website and social media content) in the UK is regulated by the Advertising Standards Authority, and consumer protection law is upheld by Trading Standards – the latter of whose budgets have been under severe strain along with all Local Authority spending, rendering it practically impossible to receive even a response to a complaint, let alone action.

Beyond those organisations sits a small network of skeptical activists, whose interests in consumer protection sees them engaging with the regulatory framework by seeking out misleading health claims and reporting them to the relevant regulator or register. For some of the most fortunate of that small band, doing so has become a full-time job.

This voluntary role of external watchdog can feel like an uphill struggle and a thankless task, though success is possible: for example, despite the GOsC’s initial (and farcical) insistence that no complaints would be investigated until they’d first been looked at by the Advertising Standards Authority, reporting misleading claims by osteopaths seemed to make an appreciable difference. A review in 2015 by my colleague at Good Thinking found that 33% of osteopaths were in clear breach of advertising standards; by 2017, after submitting hundreds of complaints to the GOsC, that figure had dropped to 16%. It is currently unclear whether those gains have stood the test of the last seven years.

As for the chiropractic industry, in 2021 I conducted an audit which found that 56% of fifty randomly chosen chiropractors were making claims that were not compliant with the advertising code. After several discussions with the GCC, I decided to contact those chiropractors directly, to let them know of my concerns, to direct them to which parts of their advertising I felt were non-compliant, and to invite them to update their messaging rather than begin the lengthy process of making a formal complaint. Of the 28 chiropractors I’d identified as making erroneous health claims, 21 updated their advertising as a result of my email approach, with many thanking me for directing them to the problematic content. It was an unexpected outcome – and one whose lasting impact is yet to be assessed – but one that highlighted that many practitioners are genuinely willing to try to stay within the guidelines, if they’re helped to do so. Clearly, there is a role for a regulator to take a proactive approach, rather than to wait for complaints to come in (or, worse, to wait for other less specific regulators to have investigated and made a ruling).

While osteopaths and chiropractors are the only alternative medicine practitioners who are subject to statutory regulation, other alternative healthcare practitioners are subject only to voluntary regulation, via the Professional Standards Authority’s Accredited Register (AR) programme. Inclusion in the AR programme is not a mark of efficacy, but it is meant to be a mark of good governance, and of trustworthiness – essentially, a sign that unprofessional behaviour or misleading health claims will not be tolerated. For many of the organisations who have signed up to the AR scheme, the risk of the latter is likely minimal – it’s less likely that practitioners in the fields of play therapy, sports rehab or counselling are comprehensively filled with false health claims. However, in the case of other accredited registers, the risk of being seen to endorse pseudoscientific modalities is much higher – such as in the case of the Complementary and Natural Healthcare Council (CNHC).

The CNHC was set up in 2008 as a voluntary register, and currently oversees more than 6,000 registrants, including from the fields of aromatherapy, colon hydrotherapy, craniosacral therapy, kinesiology, naturopathy, reflexology and Reiki. It is by some margin the largest register in the PSA’s Accredited Register scheme, and the breadth of pseudoscience it regulates no doubt makes it’s remit tricky to manage. At least when the Society of Homeopaths were part of the PSA’s AR scheme, it’s 1,400 members all broadly believed in the same core principles (the SoH, it’s worth noting, withdrew from the AR scheme in 2021 after members were discovered to be promoting homeopathic vaccines and cures for autism); the same cannot be said for modalities like Reiki, aromatherapy, or naturopathy, whose fundamental principles share little in common, and in many cases are fundamentally incompatible with one another.

To date, the CNHC’s approach to regulation has been a manual one, with members of the CNHC’s small team searching their database periodically to peruse member websites, looking to spot claims that don’t have a solid foundation. The limitations of this labour-intensive form of regulation ought to be readily apparent: even if it took as little as 15 minutes to scour and fully evaluate the claims on a given website, the CNHC would struggle to review 25 websites per day – barely scratching the surface of their 6,000+ membership. In reality, with so many different members to review, and such a wide range of therapies, based on such a divergence of theories, the chances of a misleading health claim being spotted by the regulator is very low – meaning the chances that a false health claim will find its way to a vulnerable member of the public is incredibly high.

The scale of the health misinformation problem among CNHC registrants was today highlighted in a new paper, published in the online journal Royal Society Open Science, in which researchers trained an AI tool to scan and evaluate health claims from over 11,000 web pages, representing 725 of the CNHC’s registrants. The AI tool, developed by independent IT scientist Simon Perry, also produced a rationale for why each claim was judged false.

According to the study, 97% of the websites in question contained health misinformation, including some claims related to the treatment of cancer – claims which could therefore be in breach of the Cancer Act (1939). To ensure the tool was accurate, results were compared to the independent findings of a group of experienced skeptics tasked with appraising a sample of the CNHC registrants’ websites, who found a similar prevalence of misleading health claims.

Among the results, the paper analysed claims from 240 reflexologists, 236 of whom were found to be making claims that could not be substantiated, while 146 of the 149 Reiki practitioners assessed were making problematic claims. Elsewhere, all of the 20 “Healing” practitioners, 18 Kinesiologists, and 26 Shiatsu massage therapists were found to be making misleading health claims. Examples of claims which were flagged by the AI tool as erroneous include an acupuncturist who claimed to be able to resolve a chronic knee problem within three sessions, a detox therapy which proponents claim is effective in curing hangovers and relieving allergy symptoms, and an aromatherapist who claimed to be able to prevent shingles, pneumonia and chicken pox.

“It was believed by CNHC and PSA that only 30% of the websites regulated by CNHC contained false claims”, explained Simon Perry. “While we did not look at all therapy types, we demonstrated that in the therapy types we did look at, the problem is much more serious – 97%”.

A laptop on a table

Image by LUNEMax from Pixabay

“We have also demonstrated that, using Large Language Models, it is easy and cheap to analyse thousands of web pages and check for false claims with the same accuracy as an expert,” he continued. “That low cost is particularly significant. We estimated it would cost $150,000 to do this manually, or around $500 with ChatGPT4. But OpenAI halved their prices by the time we started, and it cost $250. It has again halved twice since then, bringing the cost to just $60. That’s to check through 12,500 web pages – but CNHC would only need to do this once. After that, it’s completely feasible to check all the websites every day, scanning for changes, and picking up false claims as soon as they come online. The CNHC and other regulators of pseudoscientific health practices can now choose to largely automate the compliance process”.

While the paper has only just been published, I have been aware of its findings for some time, as I’ve been working with the research team all year to put the findings to the CNHC and to find ways in which to help the CNHC take effective action to protect the public from misleading claims. As a result, following on from my experiences with chiropractors, I randomly selected 100 therapists from the study’s results, and contacted them to bring their attention to the issues the AI had identified.

Once again, the response was interesting. Discounting the 21 practitioners for whom no contact details were listed, or whose email address bounced, I was left with 79 registrants that I was able to successfully contact. Of those, half never responded, but of the responses I received, 4 had already made edits to the site by the time I got in touch, 5 indicated that they’d be speaking to their professional organisation for guidance, and 15 indicated that they were very happy to make changes, and thanked me for my help in bringing their attention to the issues. Only 7 responded to refuse to review their content at all, and instead asked that I make a formal complaint so that the ASA could make an assessment – which, naturally, I happily did.

Many of the registrants I contacted responded to say that they do strive to stay within the guidance, but that they struggle to understand what they can and can’t say; most seemed unaware that the ASA provides a free service to check advertising copy for compliance, so that any issues can be spotted before being shared with the public.

It seems to be the case that there is an appetite among many CNHC registrants to understand the rules, and to stay within them, and what is needed is proactive engagement to help them identify and correct misleading claims. Clearly, the CNHC’s current approach of manually finding, scrolling, reading and checking websites, page by page, is not sufficient, and as a result thousands of false health claims are finding their way to the public, via websites whose pages carry the stamp of legitimacy of an accredited register. This latest research has demonstrated that there is a smarter, quicker and far more effective way of spotting claims that go far beyond the evidence.

Equally, the fact is that half of those registrants I reached out to never even responded, and a fifth were uncontactable in the first place. Of those I did hear from, 10% were unwilling to listen to my concerns – which illustrates how important it is that the proactive engagement and enforcement comes from the register themselves, whose carrot of cooperation is backed up by the stick of potential removal from the register.

What does this mean for the future of alternative medicine regulation? According to Perry, the next step could be to replicate the study with other regulators, such as the GCC, GOsC or Society of Homeopaths, while the same tool that highlighted the scale of this problem can also be used to monitor the effectiveness – or otherwise – of any corrective action the CNHC take.

The tools are out there to make regulation less random, and more strategic and targeted – this latest research is a perfect illustration of that. As I’ve also discovered, the will is there among some therapists to ensure they’re not misleading the public; and where there isn’t the will to clean up their act, regulatory action has to be taken. This applies not just to the CNHC, but to all healthcare regulators and registers. Ultimately, ineffective regulation only harms the end user: the patient or consumer who puts their trust and their health into a treatment that cannot possibly help them.

From the archives: Urban legends – a friend of a friend of a friend of a friend

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This article originally appeared in The Skeptic, Volume 4, Issue 3, from 1990.

Did you hear the one about the take-away chicken that turned out to be a deep-fried rat? Or the beehive hairdo that concealed a carnivorous spider? Or the alligator in the sewers, the mouse bones in the Coke bottle, the pet in the microwave? These are the kind of bizarre ‘urban legends’ that we all seem to have heard, but they have one thing in common: they’ve all happened to a FOAF – a friend of a friend – or, more often, a friend of a FOAF. They ‘re FOAFlore.

Jan Harold Brunvand, Professor of English at the University of Utah, believes that the more variations there are on a tale, the less likely it is to be based on real events. Take, for example, the ‘Choking Doberman’ story. One American version runs like this: a woman returns home from work to find her large Doberman dog lying on the floor wheezing and gasping for air. Unable to see what’s wrong she takes the dog straight to the vet, who decides to perform a tracheotomy to let the dog breathe. The woman leaves the dog with the vet and goes back home, to find her telephone ringing. She answers it it’s the vet, shouting “Get out of the house straight away! Call the police!” During the tracheotomy the vet had found two black human fingers lodged in the dog’s throat, and was concerned that they belonged to an intruder who might still be in the woman’s house. He was. When the police arrived they found an unconscious black man crammed into a bedroom wardrobe, lying in a pool of blood, and minus two fingers.

In The Choking Doberman and Other ‘New’ Urban Legends (Penguin, 1987) Jan Brunvand collects an enormous number of American, British and Australian variations on this story. The kind of dog ranges from German Shepherd to Alsatian, the intruder may be dead or apprehended, different parts of the body are missing, the racial element (often present only in oral versions of the story) may be different, and so on. But, the tale is based on a number of ‘motifs’, the key elements which structure the story, and around which specific cultural and prejudicial details swirl. In the Choking Doberman we have – at least – the suffering pet, the urgent telephone warning, racial hatred and fear, sexual menace, the come-uppance of the evil-doer.

I can imagine the story being told in my local, metamorphosing to reflect the 1990 Manchester zeitgeist: the Doberman is now a Rottweiler; the location is a large detached house in Wilmslow, a prosperous predominantly white middle-class suburb; on one of the fingers is a red, green and black ring – the colours of the Rastafarian. The telephone is an answering machine, and the vet’s message is waiting when the woman returns. When the police arrive there is a be-tracksuited intruder crouched bleeding underneath the bed. Plus ça change…

The Choking Doberman story illustrates one of the key elements in the nature of FOAFlore. While it is in itself an unpleasant story, with its overtones of menace, racial hatred and mutilation, it is somehow not offensive, in the way that we might find a joke unacceptable for being ‘racist’, ‘sexist’ or ‘sick’. Brunvand’s analysis of the origins of the story illustrates that the nature of FOAFlore is enormously complex: the Choking Doberman is a distillate of many other FOAFtales: The Elevator Incident, The ‘Wagger’ story, The Severed Fingers, The Robber Who Was Hurt – each with a similarly tangled provenance.

As a tale develops and spreads, motifs are shared and exchanged; some versions fade, but some have such strong elements, with which we can all identify, that they become icons. Anyway, we like to hear tall stories: they help us escape from the humdrum, and they ‘brighten up Mondays’. FOAFlore is art, and we are the artists.

Perhaps the most well-known FOAFtale is ‘The Vanishing Hitch-hiker’ : a man picks up a hitch-hiker; she gets into the back seat; after they’ve driven for a while, he looks back-she’s vanished; he stops the car, scared to death; later he learns that exactly a year ago a hitch-hiker had been killed in that exact place. The extraordinary number of variations on this tale is an indication of the fundamental strength of its basic ‘ghost’ motif. It is painstakingly documented in Brunvand’s first urban legend collection The Vanishing HitchHiker (Picador, 1983).

There is even a song: connoisseurs of horrible records win enjoy ‘Laurie’ by Dickie Lee· (Kenny Everett’s World’s Worst Record Show, Yuk Records, 1978), which is based on ‘Vanishing Hitchhiker’ motifs. One researcher has tried to track down some British versions of the tale, and actually believes that the legend has a basis in fact (The Evidence For Phantom Hitch-Hikers by Michael Goss (Aquarian, 1984)).

Most professions have their own FOAFtales. In computer circles, there are many: the disgruntled ex-IBM employee taking an axe to a multi-million-dollar computer; the secret command built into a computer by a mischievous engineer which causes it to catch fire, or – my favourite – the one about the secretary with her new word-processor. On the sleeve of her floppy disc is the legend: remove disk from outer cover. After a few minutes struggle with a pair of scissors she finally manages to get all the packaging off, and is left with a neat circle of brownish plastic. I happen to know this one is true; I heard it from a colleague who had a friend who knew a bloke…

Does the colour of a pill really influence what kind of placebo effect you’ll experience?

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Interest in homeopathy seems to be on the wane, but maybe that’s just my bias.

While homeopathy is naked pseudoscience, it nevertheless yields occasional positive results in clinical trials. For scientists, skeptics, and those with an interest in the philosophy of science, this serves as an example of how poor trial design can lead to unreliable conclusions. Homeopathy, like acupuncture, has a habit of showing strong effects in badly designed trials, and small or no effect in well-conducted ones. If the heyday of homeopathy is over, perhaps we need a new paradigm to illustrate how weak design can mislead us?

I propose: the powerful placebo.

Over the coming months, I hope to explore some of what has been described as the crème de la crème of placebo effect research, scrutinising the biases, flaws, and weaknesses that challenge the widely accepted view of placebos as having real, powerful therapeutic effects. We will examine the primary literature to see if the work is really as compelling as some would have us believe.

Blackwell 1972, originally published in The Lancet, is a favourite of science communicators, who breathlessly claim it as a demonstration of how the colour of a placebo pill changes its effect. Blackwell took 56 medical students at the University of Cincinnati and randomised them to receive either blue or pink placebo pills. A further 44 students declined to take part, after learning what the study involved.

The students were told that they would receive either a sedative or a stimulant drug, but that they would not know which. They were also given a list of effects and side effects they could expect to experience as a result of taking the drugs. Six effects and six side effects for each, for a total of 24 expected effects.

The pill colour was assigned randomly, resulting in 29 of the students being given blue pills, and the remaining 27 receiving pink pills. In fact, all of the pills were placebos; there were no real drugs involved. Blackwell reports:

“There were two significant differences due to colour, both indicative of the blue capsules producing more sedative effects than pink capsules. 66% of subjects on blue capsules felt less alert compared with 26% on pink; 72% on blue capsules felt more drowsy compared to 37% on pink.”

Aside from the fact that ‘less alert’ and ‘more drowsy’ are arguably the same thing, there are more serious concerns with the study’s methodology if we are using it to support such extraordinary claims.

For one thing, it is only single-blind. Reading the paper, this seems to have in fact been an exercise to teach a group of medical students about placebos that their professor decided to write up for The Lancet after the fact. As a class exercise, of course the professor knew that the pills were placebos, and knew what the expected effects were. In an illustration for students, that is to be expected. But today this paper is used to support the purported effects of pill colour generally.

Moreover, the professor provided the students with a list of effects they can expect to experience after taking the pills. They were told that stimulants would make them more cheerful, more talkative, more alert, less drowsy, less sluggish, and less tired. They were also warned the stimulants would make them more tense, more jittery, more irritable, less relaxed, less calm and less easy going. Sedatives were said to cause the opposite effects, so less cheerful, more sluggish, and so on.

Since the students were asked to self report their condition after taking the pills, it’s hardly surprising they reported some of the many effects they were told to expect. Confirmation bias, if nothing else, would lead them to notice and report the changes highlighted by their professor, even if they may have ignored those same changes had they not first been prompted to look for them. In psychology, this is referred to as priming.

Researchers frequently overlook this and fail to acknowledge that there is a distinction between the reported effect of an intervention and the true effect, because of the role of bias. In fact, a 2010 review on placebo effects for Cochrane concluded that it is ‘difficult to distinguish patient-reported effects of placebo from biased reporting’.

It is also notable that, despite the potential confounding role of bias, only two of the 24 effects that students were asked to look out for rose to the level of statistical significance. The paper does not give specific p-values for those two findings, but notes that findings were reported as ‘significant’ if p<0.05.

For those who aren’t statistical experts, the p or probability value tells us how likely it is that we would see these results if the null hypothesis is true – in this case, if there is no actual effect of the pill colour. A p-value of 0.05 means there’s a 5% chance of observing these results purely by chance, assuming no real effect. However, each comparison made is another roll of the dice, another opportunity to obtain a false positive by statistical fluke, and Blackwell tests against many different outcomes.

One common technique used to account for this is the Bonferroni Correction, which adjusts the p-values to account for the number of comparisons being made, reducing the chance of a false positive.

While the paper does not present the raw data, sufficient data is provided for us to work backward the raw figures, at least for the two significant findings. We know how many participants there were in total, and we know how many were given each colour. The paper reports that 66% of people who had blue pills reported less alertness, which equates to nineteen people (65.51%). Applying the same methods to the other groups, we can determine the raw figures for the two ‘significant’ colour findings.

Less AlertMore Drowsy
Blue Pills (n = 29)19 (66%)21 (72%)
Pink Pills (n = 27)7 (26%)10 (37%)
(n = number of participants)

From here, we can compute our own p-values, using a chi-squared test, and apply a Bonferroni correction. This reveals that, once adjusted for multiple comparisons, neither alertness (p = 0.072) or drowsiness (p = 0.19) are actually significant findings.

While this study may have originally been designed as an educational tool for medical students, its citation by science communicators today as robust evidence of a powerful placebo effect invites a higher level of scrutiny. It is perhaps no surprise it fails to hold up when evaluated against more rigorous standards than it may have originally been designed to bear.

This is a small, single-blind study, based on self-reported data – a potent combination that opens the door to all sorts of biases. Worse still, the students were primed with a list of possible effects, making it more likely they would report something, even if they hadn’t felt much. This isn’t good science, it’s a recipe for false positives.

Of course, Blackwell was not the final word on pill colour and placebo, there are other studies that claim to find an effect, but those are stories for another day.

Donald Trump’s debate performance proved he has mainstreamed extreme conspiracy theories

On the 10th of September the US presidential race held its first and likely only debate between former president Donald Trump and current vice-president Kamala Harris. By most accounts, Harris won the debate, clearly articulating positions (though not specific policies) and defending her work in the Biden administration. The former president however, degenerated into a series of anti-immigrant talking points that he kept circling back to at the expense of taking legitimate shots against the current administration.

This was expected. The appeal of Trump back in 2016 – the only substantial policy he seemed to push for was the same as what we would find from UKIP: no more immigrants. The only salient difference is that in the US we have a land border that can be exploited for fear. Aside from “Mexico” the former president was always talking about an amorphous problem of “them.” “They” are stealing our jobs, creating crime, and draining our resources. This time though, the claims were different, they were more specific – but also they were strange, strange even for a person who placed a plaque on his golf course commemorating a US Civil War Battle that never happened.

For non-skeptics, or even for skeptics who are not into the conspiracy theory parts of life; the claims seemed absurd and shockingly abrupt. For those of us in the conspiracy theory world, they were shocking but for a much different reason. Earlier this year I was forced, in the name of intellectual honesty, to defend David Icke when he criticised people like Joe Rogan, Alex Jones, Tim Pool, and David Rubin (the latter two have recently been discovered as being paid by the Russians, in an effort to sow division and chaos in American politics). I reference that article because Icke called these people the “Mainstream Alternative Media,” (MAM) and this debate showed us that these are the people that the former president and his inner circle are getting their information from. We know this because of four distinct things that Trump said during his debate with Harris.

I’m going to start with the most visible of Trump’s comments: that “they” (immigrants) are eating people’s pets in Springfield OH. While the internet has had a joyful reaction to this claim, we should take care of what this means. It’s not a dog whistle as some have said, it’s just a whistle. The point of this story is to take the familiar trope that immigrant populations eat “weird food” and wrap that up in an insidious claim that that they are roving the streets looking to abduct and kill our beloved pets. This reduces these populations to being nothing more than vermin animals like coyotes or badgers, that need to be culled.

The story that this claim is based on is a bit convoluted. There was a woman who was recently charged with killing and eating a cat, which did not take place in Springfield but in the city of Canton, OH. This person was not only not a Haitian immigrant, but she was also not an immigrant at all. One of the stories about a murdered pet can’t seem to be proven to have happened at all. Then there are two stories which involve actual Haitian immigrants. The first is a bus accident in 2023 which resulted in the death of child. The second was a report to police that a group of Haitian man had killed some Geese. The reason that this story doesn’t fit with the anti-immigrant narrative that the Trump-Vance campaign is pushing is that the concern wasn’t that someone’s pets had gone missing, but that the men in question had killed the Geese out of the appropriate hunting season. The concern was found to be baseless; but these stories form the nucleus of the conspiracy. Since then there have been bomb threats to Springfield’s city hall, elementary, and high school.

The border claims are different. As I wrote in the introduction, Trump’s position has been that the border needs be “secure.” This is because, as he claimed during the debate that the populations coming through the Southern border are nothing more than criminals, terrorists, and people who have recently been let out of “insane asylums.” For the last one I’m sure he’s trying to evoke images of Gotham City’s Arkham Asylum and not an actual mental health facility.

The tendency to those opposed to these ideas is that this is, again, par for the course for anti-immigrant racism. However, this go around the language is more extreme. Over the last few years, the talk from the MAM has not been about immigrants stealing US jobs, rather to characterise immigration as an invasion. It’s no longer people willing to work for less pay than the average American, but ‘military aged’ men who are trained and waiting to destroy the country. It’s no longer an economic worry, it’s now the same claims that we hear from  “Great Replacement” conspiracy theorists online.

Since 2020 Alex Jones has pivoted from a general hate for immigrants to specific fear-mongering that Democrats are brainwashing foreign populations, bringing them into the US, and then forcing them to vote. This is nothing more than the talking points that Tucker Carlson has provided when he talks about immigrants destroying the “normal” America and directly citing the “Great Replacement Conspiracy” theory. Trump is just smart enough to stop talking before he begins blaming Klaus Schwab and George Soros; but not enough to never make these claims to begin with.

He’s getting this information from news sources that he trusts, but none of these sources are what we should think of as mainstream. This is part of a disturbing feedback loop the former president is involved in. He makes an immigration claim, and someone like Alex Jones repeats it but looks for some story – any story, which tangentially is related to that claim. In this case we get a triple hearsay story about a dead cat in a tree which is then amplified through anti-immigrant conspiracy theorists like Charlie Kirk and Alex Jones. Jones discussed the story in his coverage of the debate the next day with a caller from a different county, completely unrelated to the “pet” situation, which again, did not happen. It’s only purpose is to inflame racial prejudices, which vice-presidential candidate JD Vance openly admitted to.

The third clue is that of his reference to Aurora, Colorado. Trump said this:

You look at Springfield, Ohio. You look at Aurora in Colorado. They are taking over the towns, they are taking over buildings They are going in violently. These are the people that she and Biden let into our country, and they are destroying our country. They are at the highest level of criminality, and we have to get them out — we have to get them out fast.”

The criticism over his immigration rants has been focused on pets, probably because it seems more absurd, and it is certainly more personal to pet owners. However, the Aurora claim is that a Venezuelan prison gang has taken over the apartment complex and claimed it like some kind of feudal lord, or perhaps one of two excellent action movies where gangs have taken over the totality of a residential area.

The claim Trump is repeating concerns an apartment building was turned into a stronghold for the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua. While city officials have reported that there has been some gang activity in the city, crime in Aurora is down and the building in question was closed by officials for safety and health reasons. The owner of the building, who has been fighting numerous complaints, claimed that the gang’s control over the building made it impossible to make repairs. The story seems to be that a slumlord is pretending that his negligence is the result of immigrants rather than anything else.

The story has been circulating in conspiracy theorists’ anti-immigration rants for a while now. It was only a few weeks ago that I became aware of it on Jones’ show (via Knowledge Fight). It’s one of those stories that seems too good to be true if you are touting the fears of immigrant invasions.

The next clue, in the words of Vox, is Trump’s reference to the failed coup attempt as “J6.” This is the term used online for the assault on the US Capitol when Trump’s loss in the 2020 election was being certified. No one, outside the internet, refers to it as “J6.” As Levitz points out J6 is an “abbreviation that few who have never been subject to a microblogging platform’s character limit would have any reason to use or even recognize.” In other words, it gets called “J6” on Trump’s social media platform and Twitter in order to save on the character limit. No one abbreviates it like that, other than conspiracy theorists who believes the contradictory notion that the failed coup was actually a “false flag” by the deep state but also that the incompetent insurrectionists did nothing wrong. Trump’s further reference to “Ashli Babbit,” the conspiracy theorists’ martyr of the failed coup attempt, rather than the police officers that were killed, is a stark display that the conspiracy theorists’ telling of the event is the one which he prefers.

We’re entering into a difficult and dangerous period where the most extreme conspiracy theories are getting traction with a person who once was the US President and could very possibly return to that office. While the stark comments about the murdered and eaten pets are getting some of the more mainstream conservatives to condemn those statements, that does little to call them back. It certainly doesn’t stem the aforementioned bomb threats to those communities nor does it lessen anti-immigrant feelings. These conspiracy theories are only getting more extreme as conspiracy theorists can justify their position with the Trump campaign’s endorsement, an endorsement they helped create.

Trump’s lies aside, what is the basis for our revulsion at the idea of eating cats and dogs?

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In the recent presidential debate in the United States, Donald Trump said, in reference to immigrants:

In Springfield, they are eating the dogs. The people that came in, they are eating the cats. They’re eating – they are eating the pets of the people that live there.

This claim has been thoroughly debunked. As one Springfield police spokesperson said:

we wish to clarify that there have been no credible reports or specific claims of pets being harmed, injured or abused by individuals within the immigrant community.

Trump was trying to pull a very old trick in the populist handbook. Throughout history, accusations of cannibalism and unusual eating habits have often been used as a tool for dehumanising and delegitimising specific groups. Such accusations were commonly employed by European colonisers against indigenous peoples in Africa, the Americas, Oceania, and other regions as a means to portray them as savage and uncivilised, justifying their subjugation, exploitation, and even extermination.

These narratives of cannibalism and unusual eating habits were not only used to create fear and misunderstanding among different cultures but also served as propaganda tools that facilitated the expansion of empires and helped maintain power dynamics that favored European interests over those of colonised peoples.

But for the sake of argument, let us suppose that Trump’s claim is true. If someone steals someone else’s pet to eat it, then certainly it is objectionable. Yet, the theft itself does not have the shocking effect that Trump was intending. If the claim were that migrants steal pigs and cows to eat them, probably few eyebrows would be raised; after all, these types of thefts do happen occasionally. The shocking effect pertains to the type of animals being eaten: dogs and cats.

The animals that are eaten each year in the Yulin festival in China are not stolen. Quite the opposite, they are raised and killed by farmers, and their meat is sold and eaten by attendees. Yet, this festival elicits particular animosity in many people, because the animal species served on dishes are dogs.

There are some legitimate concerns about the miserable conditions in which dogs are kept in cages in preparation for the festival. But this is where the hypocrisy begins. Those Westerners eager to criticise such conditions in far-away China ought to begin their activism closer to home. Farms and slaughterhouses in most – if not all – Western countries are not exactly humane. As Peter Singer sensibly points out in his classical manifesto Animal Liberation:

To protest about bullfighting in Spain, the eating of dogs in South Korea, or the slaughter of baby seals in Canada while continuing to eat eggs from hens who have spent their lives crammed into cages, or veal from calves who have been deprived of their mothers, their proper diet, and the freedom to lie down with their legs extended, is like denouncing apartheid in South Africa while asking your neighbors not to sell their houses to blacks.

It is hard to find any significant moral difference between the Yulin festival and, say, Thanksgiving. If we come to agree that we have stronger obligations towards animals closer to us as a species – an assumption that would still be debatable – then perhaps eating dogs is worse than eating turkeys. Additionally, on account of their intelligence, cats and dogs probably have more elaborate consciousness than turkeys, so that might also lend some support to the idea that we are more justified in eating turkeys instead of dogs.

But what about pigs? Many studies suggest that pigs are as intelligent as dogs, if not more. Yet, few people in Western countries have moral qualms about the Saturday afternoon pork barbecue.

These inconsistencies reveal that most people’s judgments about which animals can and cannot be eaten are determined by specific cultural circumstances, and not substantial moral concerns. Anthropologists have long sought explanations for these variations in food taboos. For example, Marvin Harris famously explained that dogs are a food staple in China because that nation has traditionally struggled to find other sources of protein, and the advantages usually provided by dogs in Western societies – eg companionship – can be provided by other animals or humans. This explanation may or may not be accurate, but it does seem that, whatever the reason a society chooses not to eat a particular animal, it has little to do with morality itself.

A black and tan short-hair dachsund looking with 'puppy eyes' behind the photographer
This pup is skeptical

Some people in Western nations might agree that there is a huge moral inconsistency in opposing the consumption of dogs and cats while thoroughly enjoying pork chops and Big Macs. These people would be willing to remain silent about the Yulin festival, provided dog-eating stays in China. But in their view, if a Haitian immigrant eats a dog in Springfield, that is unacceptable. As per their argument, dogs and cats have become lovable companion species in Western countries, so eating such animals hurts the sensitivity of most people and should therefore be outlawed.

This is not a very good point, for the same reason that blasphemy should not be considered a crime. By and large – some extreme cases might still be open to discussion – the offensive character of an act should not count towards its morality or legality. If you are offended by someone eating dogs, look the other way; bear in mind that many of your eating habits probably offend other people, too.

Furthermore, in claiming that eating dogs would be fine in China but not in the United States, there is a stench of moral relativism. Many post-modern critics have regrettably engaged in this intellectual vice, often claiming that human sacrifice would be morally wrong in 21st Century London, but it was not morally wrong in 16th Century Tenochtitlan because ultimately, morality is relative to the cultural context. Similar things are said about female genital mutilation, foot binding, and a host of other barbarous practices in non-Western nations, all in the name of postcolonial liberation. I counter that sound morality is universal. While there may be space for context dependence in some cases, most actions are universally right or wrong. Consequently, eating a dog – or a pig – is either right or wrong, regardless of whether it is in Yulin or Springfield.

Ultimately, if you are fully concerned about the welfare of animals, you have no other option but to become a vegetarian. It is of course hard being a vegetarian, and possibly there is no such moral requirement. Perhaps the ontological gap between our species and the rest allows us to eat animals. But moral consistency is a requirement, and if you oppose eating dogs and cats, then you must also oppose eating pigs and cows. If you choose not to be a vegetarian and enjoy that delicious steak, then you must refrain from criticising an immigrant for eating a dog. Arbitrarily deciding to oppose one but not the other, is a form of bigotry. Bigotry is a universal wrong, and it is the kind of moral flaw to which a demagogue like Trump was pandering in his now infamous remarks.

When it comes to science, the standard has to be truth and accuracy – not false balance

It’s normal to have different opinions from those of others around you about many things in life – Marmite, for example. Fashion, parenting styles, whether abstract art is any good – these are the sorts of many-sided conversations popular throughout society and the foundation for debates on daytime television shows like Loose Women, This Morning, or The Wright Stuff. Listener phone-ins on radio stations are also a staple of our culture. Exploring diverse viewpoints can make for interesting (and sometimes frustrating) viewing or listening.

When it comes to reporting, it’s reasonable to assume that the media’s job is to strive for objectivity and to present the truth as fairly and accurately as possible. One way to achieve this is through striking an impartial and balanced approach where all perspectives of an issue are fairly represented, with the audience left to weigh things up and form their opinions. While this might be an excellent approach for subjective matters – such as whether Jaffa Cakes are a biscuit or if it’s wrong to wear t-shirts for bands you don’t listen to – not all subjects should be treated with this kind of balance.

When the media misapply the principle of ‘balance’ to topics of science and fact, the effort to be impartial can lead to the false presentation of unscientific information as factual, respected opinion. This phenomenon, known as false balance, occurs when claims lacking a scientific basis are presented as equally credible as the scientific facts that counter them.

Whether it’s reporting on climate change, vaccination, sex and gender, or something different, the media habit of giving a platform to fringe views for the purpose of balance threatens to mislead the public and undermine the value of the role of science in society. As such, skeptics need to be mindful of how we engage with the media, considering whether our time and effort is spent on media projects that may unintentionally promote pseudoscience.

This is a responsibility that requires a lot of work to uphold and is often easier said than done. As a skeptic who researches and writes about paranormal phenomena, I often get invited to participate in paranormal media projects. These projects are pitched as a refreshing take on centuries-old discourse, with assurances that the shows will amplify the voice of reason fairly. However, I am often left disheartened when I eventually become involved in said projects, as this is frequently not the outcome.

Presenter of the BBC's Uncanny podcast, Danny Robins, looks back at the camera while walking away, wearing a red raincoat. The image background is a mix of 'spooky' things, from a large wood cabin-style house with a figure int he window, to a tall bigfoot-like silhouette on the right, and a glowing full moon in the sky.
Via BBC.co.uk: “Danny Robins investigates real-life stories of paranormal encounters. So, are you Team Believer or Team Sceptic?”

The BBC podcast ‘Uncanny’ provides an excellent example. As a contributor to Season 1 of the podcast, I found myself placed in a ‘skeptic vs believer’ scenario where my well-researched, rational explanations for reported ghost phenomena were treated as equal to claims from paranormal proponents, often citing misinformation, or stating personal opinion as fact. Attending a live event for the show, it dawned on me that I might not be there because I had something valuable to say but because the label of “skeptic” made the ghost stories feel more serious. Talking directly to the eyewitnesses on stage, I felt I had to tread carefully for the risk of venturing into villain territory. I couldn’t shake the feeling that this is not how science is communicated in a space in which it is valued.  

Ultimately, I declined to continue contributing to future seasons of the show because I felt that by doing so, I might unintentionally lend credibility to false claims reinforcing unscientific ideas. Engaging with misinformation can shift public discourse away from evidence-based discussions, which can impact personal decision-making and even public policy. Does a paranormal podcast have enough sway to change public policy? It’s unlikely. However, a wealth of research shows that people who hold paranormal beliefs are often more likely to buy into other forms of unscientific belief, too, such as conspiracy theories and alternative health claims.

This sort of false balance is common across mainstream media platforms, where the desire for impartiality often results in a misleading presentation of scientific discussions. In the not-too-distant past, this was quite common in discussions around climate change, where media outlets gave equal airtime to climate scientists and climate change deniers despite the overwhelming consensus on human-caused global warming.

When the media participate in this reporting style, they create a false impression that there are divides within the scientific community on the issue, which is far from the truth. It also provides those who promote unscientific ideas with an authority they do not have and have not earned, which can have dangerous implications regarding the spread of misinformation rewrapped as genuine concerns. These instances of false balance reporting by mainstream media companies lead to significant consequences for audiences, such as the rejection of vaccines or the denial of climate change.

This issue is not only found within mainstream media. The rise of social media content creators who interview controversial figures spreading misinformation has become troubling, particularly when unscientific claims go unchallenged. In many cases, content creators – often lacking the scientific literacy required to fact-check their guests – present these interviews as groundbreaking disclosures, inadvertently lending credibility to the falsehoods shared with impressionable audiences. This content is frequently shared without disclaimers or warnings from social media platforms, often spreading misinformation unchecked.

Most notably, Joe Rogan, host of “The Joe Rogan Experience”, faced significant backlash after featuring guests who spread misinformation about COVID-19 and promoted vaccine denial (such as Dr Robert Malone and Alex Jones). Rogan was criticised for allowing these guests to promote unscientific views on a large platform without challenge.

Joe Rogan and Alex Jones recording an episode of the Joe Rogan podcast
The most famous podcaster in the world promoting the conspiracy theories of his long-time friend, Alex Jones.

In stark contrast is the appearance on the “Checkup Podcast” of Dr Steven Gundry, a cardiothoracic surgeon and bestselling author known for his provocative health and nutrition claims. When Gundry controversially suggested that smoking might be linked to a longer lifespan, host Dr Mike directly challenged him on these claims – something that Gundry’s health and nutrition claims typically do not face.

More often, hosts of other podcasts react with uncritical admiration – as in his appearances on the Lewis Howes Podcast and Hone Health Podcast. During those interviews, the lack of critical questioning or fact-checking contributes to an echo chamber where pseudoscientific ideas and even dangerous health claims are treated as valid, sowing distrust in credible scientific information.

When I see science communicators and skeptics appear on “The Joe Rogan Experience” as guests, I often pause and wonder whether this was a good choice given the sort of misinformation shared on that particular platform. With good preparation, sharing a platform with those who work to promote pseudoscience can be beneficial in reaching broader audiences with scientific arguments. However, the risks of legitimising misinformation can be significant if this approach is misjudged or if scientific counterarguments are subject to stylised editing.

My personal example of how this can go wrong proves that this is not always an approach that is successful, and it has associated risks. However, what’s clear is that skeptics can play a role in addressing the false balance that various forms of media give to unscientific claims and their proponents through direct or indirect engagement. As sceptical activists, we can combat false balance by engaging with media platforms that prioritise evidence-based reporting and do not treat our contributions as equal to those spreading misinformation. We can create our own content (through blogs, podcasts, videos, and more) to contribute to challenging misinformation.

Additionally, building relationships with journalists who report on misinformation critically and pitching well-researched stories can all make a difference, as can reporting those instances where misinformation is uncritically shared in the media, and making an effort to promote content from reputable sources (even just hitting the like button on a well-sourced YouTube video or following a podcast on social media can help). By holding media creators accountable and supporting media literacy, we can ensure our contributions are treated seriously, allowing the public to make well-informed decisions and reasoned judgements based on good evidence.

When media platforms present both sides of a scientific debate as equally valid, it creates a false equivalence that undermines efforts to promote scientific truth and critical thinking. By leaving it up to people to decide for themselves, creators patronise their viewers or listeners by suggesting they’re giving them the right to make their own decisions without acknowledging they’ve polluted the information needed to make these decisions with misinformation.

Skeptics can strengthen the impact of our effort to challenge misinformation by making careful decisions about when not to share a platform with those who promote it or when an opportunity might present itself to effectively counter misinformation directly. This approach reinforces the importance of basing public discourse on good information and scientific evidence, rather than giving undeserved legitimacy to unscientific claims through the uncritical sharing of platforms.

Religion is simply a powerful placebo – offering priests a sense of ritual, but little else

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This is a story about a much-loved parish priest who looked, dressed, sounded and acted like a parish priest, but lacked what most people (including, one presumes, the Pope) would regard as the single most important and defining feature of parish priests: a belief in the Christian god and at least some of the doctrines of Christianity. In other words, he was a placebo priest.

In simple terms, a placebo is a tablet, injection or procedure – such as a surgical operation or talking and listening – that is claimed (and usually believed by the recipient) to have a specific healing effect, but actually has no such effect. The tablet and injection contain no active drug. The surgery involves just a very superficial incision into the skin that goes no further. The talking and listening are just that and are designed to exclude any specific features of particular kinds of psychotherapy. However, the recipients are either not told that they are having placebo treatment, as was generally the case until half a century ago, or they are taking part in a placebo-controlled trial and don’t know whether they are in the placebo group or having the supposedly real and effective thing.

Strictly speaking, placebo effects relate to the nature and specific features of the treatment – eg tablet, injection, surgery. Non-specific effects are also important but they include things like taking a history, listening, physical examination, reassurance, ordering investigations and establishing a good therapeutic relationship. All of these can be very comforting but are common to most therapeutic encounters. However, what reassures one patient – lots of tests and impressive machines taking electrocardiograms and X-rays – may worry another (‘Does all this attention mean I’m seriously ill?’).

Similarly, the distinctive rituals of religions, and the underlying evidence-free belief in a deity who both listens and responds to prayers, involve exactly the same placebo and non-specific effects that are still so infamous in medicine. The healing professions – orthodox and generally evidence-based as well as so-called ‘alternative’ – have their own rituals. When the roles of priest and healer were combined in the shaman, the overlap was very obvious. It still is at shrines like Lourdes.

Unsurprisingly, the more impressive the placebo and the accompanying sales-talk, the stronger the placebo effect. Impressively large or intriguingly small tablets versus average size and coloured rather than white; expensive rather than cheap; involving impressive equipment featuring flashing lights and beeping noises; extra attention, even if scripted and entirely insincere. That sort of thing.

Some placebo tablets were gold-plated to add both legitimate expense and a dash of theatre. The last gold-plated pill, a precursor of Viagra, could still be prescribed on the NHS until the 1970s.

For many people who attend churches, the drama, ritual and theatricality of the services are important parts of the overall attraction. That’s also true for many of the priests who perform at these events, especially High-Church Anglicans and the traditionalist wing of Roman Catholicism but ‘charismatic’ sects often have rituals derived from an African or Afro-Caribbean background.

Rows of plastic homeopathic remedy vials set in blue foam, with white lids containing spherical 1.4g sucrose (sugar) pills, each labelled with the remedy name and showing 30C dilution
30C homeopathic sugar pills. Image by Elderberry Arts, Flickr, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

It is in the nature of ritual that, at one level, it needs no explaining or justification. Conversely, deviations from important rituals can make people uncomfortable or angry, even if the ritual in question has no particular function beyond its performance. Priests and parishioners can get very worked up about seemingly trivial details of liturgical practice.

The importance of ‘correctly’ performing religious rituals or, conversely, of using the Latin Mass rather than modern vernacular translations, is very similar to the importance attached by homeopathic practitioners to the ritual of ‘succussion’ (ie the hitting of containers of homeopathic solutions against a leather cushion exactly one hundred times) in the preparation of their remedies. There is no rationale to succussion or the slightest evidence for its relevance, but it’s a fine old custom. The homeopathic literature insists that proper succussion and therapeutic success are causally linked and the websites of leading homeopathic pharmacies stress the importance of following the correct homeopathic rituals.

The philosopher Roger Scruton noted that:

In all places and times, people have believed that there is a way into the eternal, a door out of time into a place where nothing changes and all is at rest within its being. And the key to this door is repetition. That is what sacred rituals, sacred words, and sacred places provide: the prayers, chants, costumes, steps and gestures that must be repeated exactly, and for which there is no explanation other than that this is how things are done.

Scruton R Fools, frauds and firebrands: thinkers of the new left. London. Bloomsbury. 2015. p 185.

Notice that God is absent from Scruton’s description. Alain de Botton feels that “Secular society has been unfairly impoverished” by the loss of these and other practices:

We are presented with an unpleasant choice between either committing to peculiar concepts about immaterial deities or letting go entirely of a host of consoling, subtle or just charming rituals for which we struggle to find equivalents in secular society.

de Botton A. religion for atheists, London, Penguin, 2012, 14

Most religious procedures and rituals are supposed to have beneficial effects, including healing ones, but for a sceptic, all of these procedures are essentially placebos. That is because for atheists and agnostics (much the same thing in behavioural terms) as well as deists, they lack the one allegedly vital and specific ingredient – the existence of a deity who both listens to the prayers and responds favourably to them. Einstein said of believers in such a deity:

I cannot imagine a God who rewards and punishes the objects of his creation, whose purposes are modelled after our own — a God, in short, who is but a reflection of human frailty. …although feeble souls harbour such thoughts through fear or ridiculous egotisms.

If the deity was firmly believed not to respond, there would be no theological point in praying to it, though the ritual might still be comforting.

In most religions, priests undergo lengthy training. They are symbolically invested with allegedly special powers when ordained, and thus become intermediaries between their parishioners and the relevant deity. Like the priest-healers (AKA shamans) of homoeopathy and acupuncture, they are generally assumed to have specific knowledge that gives them specific and effective therapeutic ability. Unless they accept that their nostrums have only placebo effects, which most of them don’t, they must believe in their therapeutic doctrines.

A placebo-controlled trial of religious procedures might therefore involve exposing a group of parishioners to prayers and rituals conducted by a real believer in the relevant faith while another group was exposed to a placebo priest who made the same movements and spoke the same words but did not believe in the doctrines he was expounding. One of Edzard Ernst’s first controlled trials was of spiritual healing. It showed that actors did as well as professional healers, and that real but invisible healers sitting in kiosks got the same beneficial results as kiosks containing only air. However, the spiritual healers were not using any specific religious faith, and it was thus not a trial of Christian prayers vs Islamic or Hindu ones, Catholic vs Protestant entreaties or godly vs godless practitioners.

When modern clergy lose their faith, they do not necessarily lose or leave their clerical employment. A study by Daniel Dennett and Linda LaScola asked the question: what is it like to be a pastor who stays the course in this situation? One short answer, not much discussed in their paper, is that from the point of view of their parishioners, it makes no difference, particularly if the priest keeps his doubts to himself.

Even today, the roles of the priest and the physician often overlap. Both doctors and priests spend much of their lives demonstrating that a problem shared is often a problem halved, or at any rate a problem reduced. Both are walking and talking placebos but whereas modern doctors are rather more than that, priests – ancient or modern – are not. Provided that they look like a priest, talk like a priest and act like a priest, neither parishioners nor other priests will be able to detect priests who lack what in theory ought to be a crucially important qualification for the job; the possession of a specific religious faith. Though I argue that no priest has more than placebo and non-specific effects, a disbelieving cleric can be regarded as a sham priest for comparative purposes.

The doubting American priests interviewed by Dennett and La Scola come across as a rather sad bunch – partly because they were doing a job that made them increasingly uncomfortable, but mainly because most of them had nobody with whom they could share their sadness and discomfort. The interviews with researchers were often the first time they had been able to do that. There were only five of them in the study and they came from churches ranging from Southern Baptist through Methodist to Presbyterian, but all insisted that they were not alone and were simply the tip of a very large and rarely-mentioned theological iceberg.

The recently founded Clergy Project, ‘a confidential online community for current and former religious professionals without supernatural beliefs’ has 1,263 members as of 2024; 332 current and 931 former priests. In the US, they come from nearly all states, including the Bible Belt. Most wanted to leave their posts but wondered what they would do instead, and how they would make an equally comfortable living, especially if they lived in a church-owned house. Some couldn’t even come out to their spouses and children. One Methodist pastor who went public, Tim Prowse, admitted that:

As an active minister, I did not discuss my atheism with colleagues or parishioners. Facing lost wages, housing and benefits, I chose to remain silent. However, I did confide in my wife who provided a level of trust, understanding, and support that proved invaluable. Unfortunately, some ministers do not enjoy mature confidants.

Happily for him, friends offered him cheap housing and a job.

Placebo priests of the past

That was not an option for Jean Meslier, the first recorded Christian priest to say publicly and in print (or at any rate, in manuscript) that the whole thing was essentially a myth, that the Bible was clearly man-made and full of contradictory and unpleasant stories, and that religion had been co-opted by ruling elites to consolidate their hold over the lower orders. This first placebo priest that we know of spent most of his priestly life providing completely insincere prayers and rituals for his appreciative parishioners in the late 17th and early 18th centuries, apparently without any of them noticing the missing ingredient.

That he is so little known probably reflects the fact that it has taken nearly 300 years for his only work to be recently translated into English. None of the ‘new atheists’ has mentioned him, and he didn’t appear in Atheism: A Rough History of Disbelief, Sir Jonathan Miller’s short 2004 TV series (when it was broadcast in the US, the shocking word ‘atheism’ was removed from the title).

Father Jean Meslier’s neglect by historians is surprising, because as well as being probably the first European since Roman times to put his name to an overtly atheist document, Meslier was also unusual in being an early agrarian socialist and anti-monarchist, like his near-contemporaries the Levellers of the English Civil War, though he doesn’t mention them. Furthermore, his clerical credentials were impeccable, since he passed his entire adult life as the apparently popular priest of Étrépigny, a tiny village in North-East France, and knew exactly what he was rejecting. At some personal cost, he supported his downtrodden and impoverished parishioners against the local tyrant De Toully, a rapacious and wicked squire straight out of central casting.

Too scared to speak his mind to anyone during life, in 1729 he left by his death bed three copies of a mordant, well-referenced denunciation of supernatural beliefs. He called it a Mémoire of his thoughts and sentiments about the religions of the world but it is often referred to as his Testament. “All religions are nothing but errors, illusion and imposture” is a typical chapter heading. “The wisdom and learning contained in the so-called holy books are only human” is another. To read Father Meslier is to read an earlier, rustic incarnation of Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris and Christopher Hitchens. There’s nothing new about the ‘new atheists’.

Despite his small library and apparent lack of intellectual company, he criticised the numerous errors and inconsistencies in the Bible well before German theologians got round to it over a century later and over two centuries before Catholics were officially allowed to, in 1943, including asking, “What certainty do we have that the four Gospels…were not corrupted and falsified, as we see happen to so many other books even today?” We also find proto-evolutionary thinking (Nature “acts blindly…without knowing what it is doing or why it is doing it”) – even some proto-Malthusian anxieties. All very modern, as is his defence of divorce when domestic strife makes children miserable and parents “give them bad examples every day and fail to educate them… in the arts and sciences as well as in good manners”. Meslier himself had a young ‘housekeeper’ (he passed her off as a cousin) and evidently had relaxed views about sex. Though not a vegetarian, he deplored the prevalent brutality towards farm animals.

Father Jean Meslier - a portrait drawing on a yellowed page
Father Jean Meslier, from page 6 of “Superstition in all ages: by Jean Meslier, a Roman Catholic priest, who, after a pastoral service of thirty years at Etrepigny and But in Champagne, France, wholly abjured religious dogmas, and left as his last will and testment, to his parishioners, and to the world, to be published after his death, the following pages, entitled Commmon sense.” Via Library of Congress

His neglect by historians may also be due to another dangerously heretical book titled ‘Common Sense’, wrongly attributed to Meslier since the 1790s and still confusingly published under his name. In some ways, ‘Common Sense’ is better written, but its real author was an amiable aristocrat, the Baron d’Holbach, who wisely published everything pseudonymously and almost certainly rejected Meslier’s radicalism, which was briefly recognised during the Revolution that followed d’Holbach’s perfectly-timed natural death in 1789. In contrast, Voltaire said that Meslier wrote “like a carthorse”. It’s true that Meslier can be repetitious, but there are several flashes of scorn and humour, though his most famous (and invariably mis-attributed) phrase – “I would like to see the last king strangled with the guts of the last priest” – is not his own, as he truthfully records.

In 1761, Voltaire published a dishonest and much-shortened travesty of the Mémoire that made Meslier appear a deist, like Voltaire himself. It excised all reference to Meslier’s anti-monarchism and egalitarianism (both of them absolute anathema to Voltaire), presenting him as a death-bed convert rather than the life-long disbeliever he had undoubtedly been.

Meslier’s parishioners knew nothing of his heretical views, and neither did his priestly neighbours, nor his superiors. The local Archbishop, down the road at Reims, rapped his knuckles when he preached against the rapacity of Squire de Toully, but records of parish inspections confirm that in all other respects, he was regarded even by Reims as a good and well-organised priest, in an age when the village priest was an important provider not just of spiritual comforts and rituals but also of official pronouncements and news.

One thing that I find rather endearing about Meslier is that despite his rejection of religion, he seems to have enjoyed his pastoral work which, in the absence of a welfare state, must have been much more comprehensive than anything a modern village priest has to contemplate. I think of him as a bit like an old-fashioned country doctor – a Dr Finlay figure, knowing almost everything that went on in the village and possibly the only really literate and well-read inhabitant.

His neat entries in the parish register indicate a sound education and confirm the authenticity of the Mémoire manuscripts in the Bibliothèque Nationale. We can easily imagine what went through his mind as he intoned every day the words of the mass and of all the other services – baptisms, weddings and funerals – that were so central to village life. Especially funerals, for the post-mediaeval ‘Little Ice Age’ reached one of its peaks during Meslier’s tenure. The winter of 1708-9 was probably the coldest on record and over half a million died of famine in France alone. In Venice, people skated on the lagoon and as if what was known in England as ‘The Great Frost’ wasn’t enough of a disaster, 1709 also included the War of the Spanish Succession. The site of Marlborough’s victory at Oudenaarde is an hour’s drive from Étrépigny today, just over the Belgian border. Even in happier periods:

a provincial economy within a hundred miles of Paris [in the mid-18th century] was a precarious balance between subsistence and dearth, with its agricultural technique hardly changed at all since mediaeval times.

Darwin J. After Tamerlane: the rise and fall of global empires 1400-2000. London. Penguin. 2008. 141

We know exactly what Meslier thought about Holy Communion, the most solemn and impressive bit of theatre and audience-participation in the whole, impressive business of the Mass, because he tells us. “Le dieu de pâte et farine”, he writes dismissively. “The god of dough and flour”.

Another 21st century Meslier – an unbelieving American priest who regularly blogs under the name of ‘Stan Bennett’ – describes his own feelings in church:

But while I like to study and think, the Sunday morning presentation fills me with dread because at some point, I’m going to be saying something I don’t believe. My whole life, I have tried to be truthful, and now I am intentionally saying something I don’t believe is true. This is what causes my heart to race, my blood pressure to rise, and bones to ache… I no longer speak of developing a personal relationship with Jesus, but instead speak of being loyal to his cause, which might include social justice issues as well as concepts of love, truth, and generosity.

Asked during the same interview if he ever got any interesting or challenging questions after his Easter sermons, he replied:

I never have seen much of that. They don’t want me to rock their boat too much and force them to think because it might ruin their day. They expect me to use the religious language to which they are accustomed. Beyond the ritualism, it’s not real to most of them.[my italics] Actually, it’s hard to disturb them because they aren’t listening. …And they’ll crowd into one pew, sing the same songs as when they were young, watch the latest crop of children get baptized, smile at each other, and none of them will be able to repeat even a word or two of what I said, except maybe the funny story I told or an old thought that resonated from their Sunday school days.

A similar survey of rabbis who no longer believed in God found less unhappiness and more adaptation. As yet, no Muslim academic seems to have been brave enough or optimistic enough to question Mullahs and Imams in a similar way. Healers who don’t believe in science – homeopaths, for example – will do a lot of damage if you let them treat your hyperthyroidism or diabetes homeopathically, even if they look and sound to you like real doctors; but Roman Catholic priests who don’t believe in God and think that communion wine is just wine can be absolutely indistinguishable in their rituals and the earthly results of their ministrations from the real thing. This is placebo effect with real style.

I don’t know what the official Vatican line is on the validity of Holy Communion performed by apostates with bread and wine that they have supposedly consecrated, though apparently the actual words still do the trick even if the speaker has doubts. The Anglican church says that the sacraments “are not rendered ineffectual by the unworthiness of the minister” because “they do not do these things in their own name but in Christ’s and minister by His commission and authority”, but what happens if ‘unworthiness’ means not sexual or financial misbehaviour, but a fundamental rejection of Christ’s existence, genealogy, commission and authority? Were Meslier’s deceived parishioners automatically excluded from heaven? It seems that having an unbelieving and privately blasphemous priest made no difference to their daily lives as compared with neighbouring parishes served by conventional and conforming priests.

If there had been any obvious differences between Étrépigny and its neighbours as regards infant mortality, fertility, longevity, the incidence of common childhood and adult diseases and the health of its flocks and crops, I think the locals would have noticed and commented. The same presumably goes for Stan Bennett’s parishioners, except that today’s detailed mortality and morbidity statistics would have revealed any differences even more quickly. Epidemiologists would soon descend on any town or suburb with unexpectedly large or small numbers of patients with particular diagnoses, or of deaths.

We certainly know, as Meslier did, what that official Vatican line was when it came to unbelievers themselves, because he mentions a particularly brutal example that occurred only a few decades before his birth. Lucilio Vanini, who sometimes called himself Julio Cesare Vanini, was a well-connected itinerant academic and philosopher from a prosperous Italian family – a sort of Alain de Botton of his time. He had a lively and irreverent writing and lecturing style but his contacts with the movers and shakers of Parisian society kept him out of trouble until 1619.

In that year, a book that he had written came to the attention of some of the ecclesiastics and magistrates of Toulouse when he was staying in the area. It was written in the form of a Socratic dialogue and did not advocate atheism, but one of its fictional characters discussed the forbidden topic in an oblique and almost apologetic way. That was too much for the defenders of the status quo, who convicted him of atheism and blasphemy. Vanini managed to give a brave little speech before his tongue was cut out and he was strangled and burned to ashes aged only 33. Even when they had less barbaric deaths, that sort of heretic was often buried in an unmarked grave, as Meslier was when his Testament was quickly discovered and read – the Vatican equivalent of Moscow’s air-brushing of dissident communists from the official record.

These days, unhappy people in Britain are much more likely to discuss their unhappiness with a therapist than with a priest. However, there is increasing evidence that like the doctrines that supposedly lie behind satisfying religious rituals, the doctrines supposedly making for successful outcomes in counselling and psychotherapy are very much less important than the ritual, symbolic and non-specific components of ‘therapy’. Cognitive behavioural therapies are an exception but, even in CBT, the ritual and symbolic aspects may be paramount. So are other non-specific components like suggestion, expectation, hope, belief (justified or not) and the therapeutic relationship. That certainly applies to psychoanalysis. In the index to the complete works of Sigmund Freud, the highly significant missing word between ‘penis’ and ‘pleasure’ is ‘placebo’.