This article originally appeared in The Skeptic, Volume 6, Issue 6, from 1992.
A woman I know believes in the supposed prophecies of Nostradamus and Edgar Cayce, the esoteric teachings of Madame Blavatsky, psychic powers of diverse kinds, pyramid power, and the visitations of ancient as well as modem UFO aliens otherwise she seems quite rational and realistic – at least she doubts the infallibility of papal pronouncement.
Still having some optimism about the power of rational persuasion, I gave her a copy of Randi’s book Flim Flam! (Prometheus Books). Since it is, in my opinion, one of the most persuasive and entertaining antidotes to most recent forms of paranormal nonsense, I thought her days of credulity were probably numbered. However, I underestimated the power of credulity.
After I had given her several weeks to assimilate Randi’s work I telephoned, and in the course of small talk about insignificant things (world politics etc.) asked what she thought of the Randi book. Optimist that I am, I almost expected to hear her say she has seen the light and had become a born-again skeptic. Instead she said: “I don’t believe in any of Randi’s claims-I don’t like his attitude.” “His attitude?” I asked, hardly able to hide the contempt in my voice. There was a moment of silence on her end of the phone, so I could not resist a bit of logician’s pedantry: “What has his attitude got to do with his conclusions or methods of investigation?”
Her reply was interesting. It showed that I had missed an important consideration, namely the importance of psychological impact, of rhetoric versus logic. She said “Randi is merely a scoffer. He pokes fun at people and doesn’t have an open mind.” All the logical considerations I was able to suggest were fruitless; her mind was made up and Randi had no place in it.
I found this interesting, because it suggests some considerations which may be important to those of us who consider ourselves to be rational skeptics. Our consideration is conceptual. What does ‘skepticism’, in the sense we intend we use it, mean? How does skepticism, in this sense, differ, if at all, from ‘scoffing’? And, if they do differ, is there any necessary relationship between them? However, as interesting as such semantic considerations may be for those of us obsessed with language, there is another related consideration of greater practical importance to all of us: What is the most effective way to encourage critical thinking and to weaken credulity?
The first group of questions – the conceptual ones – are not too difficult to answer, as long as we’re satisfied with somewhat superficial answers. A good dictionary is probably adequate in this case. ‘Skepticism’ may therefore be defined as doubt directed toward any claims which seem to violate either well-established scientific principles or the canons of logic or both; a rational kind of doubt requiring extraordinary evidence for extraordinary claims. Using the lexicon as our guide, ‘Scoffing’ may be defined as making fun of someone or something, focusing on ludicrous aspects. Now, if these or similar meanings are adopted, then it seems clear that, logically speaking, there is no necessary connection between skepticism and scoffing – they are logically independent.
If, however, we shift our considerations from logic and semantics to human psychology, the questions are not as easily answered. This is why my credulous friend’s rejection of Randi and his investigations is interesting. Her rejection, on psychological grounds, represents a phenomenon which should make us focus on the most effective way to encourage rationality.
Is my credulous friend fairly typical of credulous people? Does scoffing, or even the appearance of scoffing – of appearing to poke fun at superstitious belief and cognitive methods – turn most credulous people off? Or, on the contrary, is humour actually the most effective way to encourage rationality in credulous people?
I do not think there are any simple, universal answers to these questions. If we examine those who have been most effective in promoting rational criticisms – people like Robert G. Ingersoll, John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, and Paul Kurtz – it is obvious that quite different mixes of humour and reason have been successful.
But perhaps it isn’t a matter of humour (or scoffing) versus serious intellectual consideration that we should be thinking about. Perhaps what we need to aim for are approaches which manage to reveal the absurdity of positions without at the same time making the credulous person feel like an object of ridicule. However, I admit that I haven’t succeeded in doing this very well myself.
